Joanna Franaszek

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Research interests	Information and communication theory, decisions under uncertainty, signalling games, general microeconomics.	nication theory, decisions under uncertainty, signalling ga- omics.	
Education	European Univeristy Institute201PhD in EconomicsThesis: On communication frictions	.8	
	Warsaw School of Economics201MSc in Quantitative Methods and Information System201Thesis: Pensions systems and fertility201	1	
	University of WarsawMSc in MathematicsThesis: Risk measures in Yaari's dual utility theory	10	
	Double Degree Programme in Economics and Mathematics200BSc in Economics200Thesis: Triopoly as a competitive and cooperative game)8	
Working papers (PhD)	Delegation as a signal: implicit communication with full cooperation		
	The paper examines the issue of implicit signaling of inexpressible type through delegation. I examine a communication game with perfectly aligned preferences, two-sided private information and communication frictions. The model is analyzed in the context of medical decision-making. A patient (principal) comes to a doctor's (agent's) office to choose one of two treatments that would suit his health needs. The patient perfectly knows, but cannot communicate his preference type and may acquire some informative, but imperfect and costly signal about his health. After observing the signal, he may choose the treatment or delegate the decision to the doctor, who observes the health perfectly. Even if the patient information acquisition and the signal are unobservable to the doctor, the patient's delegation choice, combined with the doctor's private information, allow the latter to extract some signal about the inexpressible preference type. I show that for a large class of parameters there exists an equilibrium, in which the doctor, basing on his information and the delegation decision can correctly understand cues about preferences and tailor the treatment to the patient's needs. In particular the doctor's final decision (upon delegation) may be non-monotone in health.		
	When competence hurts: revelation of complex information		
	When the information might be complex and the information processing capacit of economic agents is uncertain, noisy messages do not necessarily indicate ba- news. I exploit this intuition to examine a simple sender-receiver persuasion gam in which the precise communication of the state of the world depends not onl on sender's efforts but also on the state complexity and the receiver's competence	y d ne ly e.	

	In this environment the sender– optimal equilibria maximize the amount of noise The receiver faces a competence curse – a smarter type might end up with less information and lower payoff than a receiver with a somewhat smaller competence		
Publications (Pre-PhD)	Systemy emerytalne a rozrodczosc (Pension systems and fertility) <i>Ekonomista 5/2012</i>		
	I examine the influence of pension system on agents' fertility decisions with overlapping generations model. Under the assumption that agents derive u from quantity and quality of their offspring, I examine incentives to bear and children within PAYGO and fully funded scheme in a heterogeneous multi- system. More children are born under the PAYGO scheme, as they implicitl come a public good. However, the income–children distribution changes drasti when the system is switched to fully funded.		
Conferences	WIEM conferece, Warsaw	2018	
& workshops	$(Ce)^2$ Workshop, Warsaw	2017-2018	
	Warsaw Economic Seminar (multiple presentations)	2015-2017	
	<i>Econometric Society Summer School in Kyoto</i> (attendance) <i>World Congress of the Game Theory Society</i> (attendance)	2016 2012	
Teaching & academic activities	Warsaw School of Economics Optimization methods, Decision rules II Computer labs & exercise classes	2011-2012	
	Hummus Œconomicus economic blog hummuseconomicus.pl Owner, editor, main author	2014-2015	
Professional experience	Institute for Structural Research economist forecasting Polish labour market	since April 2018	
	Aviva Life Poland actuarial team member MCEV reporting	2010-2011	
Languages	Polish (mother tongue), English (fluent), Italian (basic)		
Computer skills	Very good command of R, LATEX, Matlab, MS Office Good command of HTML, CSS, STATA, NetLogo		