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Blog Post number 4

less than 1 minute read

Published:

This is a sample blog post. Lorem ipsum I can’t remember the rest of lorem ipsum and don’t have an internet connection right now. Testing testing testing this blog post. Blog posts are cool.

Headings are cool

You can have many headings

Aren’t headings cool?

Blog Post number 3

less than 1 minute read

Published:

This is a sample blog post. Lorem ipsum I can’t remember the rest of lorem ipsum and don’t have an internet connection right now. Testing testing testing this blog post. Blog posts are cool.

Headings are cool

You can have many headings

Aren’t headings cool?

Blog Post number 2

less than 1 minute read

Published:

This is a sample blog post. Lorem ipsum I can’t remember the rest of lorem ipsum and don’t have an internet connection right now. Testing testing testing this blog post. Blog posts are cool.

Headings are cool

You can have many headings

Aren’t headings cool?

Blog Post number 1

less than 1 minute read

Published:

This is a sample blog post. Lorem ipsum I can’t remember the rest of lorem ipsum and don’t have an internet connection right now. Testing testing testing this blog post. Blog posts are cool.

Headings are cool

You can have many headings

Aren’t headings cool?

publications

teaching

Matematyka niestacjonarne 2018/2019

undergraduate course, Warsaw School of Economics, 2018

Ćwiczenia nr 1: Granice ciągów i prostych funkcji [notatki]
Ćwiczenia nr 2: Badanie funkcji z użyciem pierwszej pochodnej [notatki]
Ćwiczenia nr 3: Badanie funkcji z użyciem obu pochodnych. [notatki]
Ćwiczenia nr 4: Kolokwium. Optymalizacja funkcji dwóch zmiennych. [notatki]
Ćwiczenia nr 5: Całki. [notatki]
Ćwiczenia nr 6: Macierze. [notatki]
Ćwiczenia nr 7: Układy równań liniowych. [notatki]
Zadania przygotowawcze do II kolokwium

Matematyka dzienne 2018/2019

undergraduate course, Warsaw School of Economics, 2018

Ćwiczenia 1: Granice ciągów. [notatki]
Ćwiczenia 2: Funkcje i ich dziedziny, granice i asymptoty. [notatki]
Ćwiczenia 3: Pochodne. Przebieg zmienności funkcji. [notatki]
Ćwiczenia 4: Reguła de l’Hospitala. Ekstrema i kresy funkcji. [notatki]
Ćwiczenia 5: Druga pochodna. Badanie zmienności funkcji. [notatki]
Ćwiczenia 6: Funkcje dwóch zmiennych. Ekstrema (bezwarunkowe). [notatki]
Ćwiczenia 7: Funkcje dwóch zmiennych. Ekstrema warunkowe. [notatki]
Ćwiczenia 8: Kolokwium. Całki nieoznaczone. [notatki]
Ćwiczenia 9: (nieobecność) Całki oznaczone. [zadania poniżej]
Ćwiczenia 10: Wektory i podprzestrzenie liniowe w R^2 i R^3. [notatki]
Ćwiczenia 11: Macierze. Dodawanie, mnożenie, rząd, wyznacznik. [notatki]
Ćwiczenia 12: Macierze. Operacje elementarne, odwracanie. [notatki]
Ćwiczenia 13: Układy równań liniowych. [notatki]
Ćwiczenia 14: Kolokwium. Jeszcze trochę o układach (notatki dorzucę do ćw. 13)
Ćwiczenia 15: Powtórka przed egzaminem. Proszę przygotować pytania :)

workingpapers

When competence hurts: revelation of complex information

Updated: November 2017

When the information might be complex and the information processing capacity of economic agents is uncertain, noisy messages do not necessarily indicate bad news. I exploit this intuition to examine a simple sender-receiver persuasion game in which the precise communication of the state of the world depends not only on sender’s efforts but also on the state’s complexity and the receiver’s competence. In this environment the sender-optimal equilibria maximize the amount of noise. The receiver faces a competence curse – a smarter type might end up with less information and lower payoff than a receiver with a somewhat smaller competence.

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Delegation as a signal: implicit communication with full cooperation

Updated: November 2017

The paper examines the issue of implicit signaling of inexpressible type through delegation in a communication game with perfectly aligned preferences, two-sided private information and communication frictions. The model is analyzed in the context of medical decision-making. A patient (principal) comes to a doctor’s (agent’s) office to choose one of two treatments that would suit his health needs. The patient perfectly knows, but cannot communicate his preference type and may acquire some informative, but imperfect and costly signal about his health. After observing the signal, he may choose the treatment or delegate the decision to the doctor, who observes the health perfectly. Even if the patient information acquisition and the signal are unobservable to the doctor, the patient’s delegation choice, combined with the doctor’s private information, allow the latter to extract some signal about the inexpressible preference type. I show that for a large class of parameters there exists an equilibrium, in which the doctor, basing on his information and the delegation decision can correctly understand cues about preferences and tailor the final treatment to the patient’s needs. In particular the doctor’s final decision (upon delegation) may be non-monotone in health.

Download here